Why the World did not Balanced against the United States since the End of the Cold War
Introduction
The
disappearance of the Soviet Union off the world stage ended the Cold War. After
the demise of second super power, the world shifted from bipolarity to unipolarity.
The United States remained as the only super power on the world stage. More
scholars expected a change in world politics towards multipolarity after the
Cold War.[1] However,
there has not been any balancing action against the United States since the end
of the Cold War.
The
United States maximized its power unprecedentedly over the years and is far
ahead of the rest of the world in terms of economic and military power. The international
order was not changed after the Cold War. The “western order”[2] mainly
the institutions that was established after the World War II still has a
dominant role in the political and economic international order. Moreover these
institutions became more powerful over the years after the end of the Cold War.
In
this paper two explanations are suggested as the answer to the question why the
world did not balanced against the United States since the end of the Cold War:
Balance of Threat and Liberal Institutionalism theories. The world did not
balanced against the United States after the Cold War because as the first
answer the balance of threat theory suggests that the United States was not
perceived as a threat by the world and as a second answer the liberal
institutionalism suggests that the institutions founded after the World War II
established a world order that enabled mechanisms for the weaker states to gain
more power, and institutions are limiting the super power. In this paper, first
I will explain the Balance of Threat theory and describe why the world did not
balanced against the United States since the end of the Cold War than I will
describe the Liberal Institutionalism theory and describe the why the world did
nor balanced against the United States.
Balance of Threat Theory and Balancing
the United States
Balance of Threat Theory
Balance
of threat theory could be explained through the balance of power theory. Kenneth
N. Waltz’s balance of power theory suggests that the weaker states balance
against or bandwagon with the superior power. Relative power itself is a
sufficient reason for explaining the weaker states behavior. The relatively
superior power in the anarchic world would risk the other states’ security. According
to balance of power theory states establish alliances either by balancing or
bandwagoning to counter superior power that could pose a threat them. States
balance because alliance with the superior one may pose a threat to the
survivability of the weaker state, and joining the strong side would made
relatively less impact on the alliance. States bandwagon to avoid possible
aggression of superior power or to gain more power by being on the stronger
side in a war. [3]
Balancing and bandwagoning are usually framed in terms of power.
While
balance of power theory states the superior state’s relative power as the reason for the weaker states’ balancing
or bandwagoning behaviors, Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory explains that
weaker states’ behaviours in terms of their perception of threat from the
superior power.[4]
Walt puts four factors that affect the level of threat: “1) aggregate power; 2) proximity; 3)
offensive capability; and 4) offensive intentions.”[5]
A
state's aggregate power (human resources, military capability, economic
capability technology, etc.) may lead
others to balancing or bandwagoning. A state can be a threat to others if it
has more resources than the others; abundant resources are key factors. States
also balance against to threats from proximate power. Because near states are
greater threats than the far away states. States that have greater offensive
capabilities are more likely perceived as threats than the states that have
lower level of offensive capabilities. States with aggressive intentions and
signs of agression it triggers a counter action (balancing or bandwagoning) of
the other states.[6]
Why
the World did not Balanced Against the United States Since the End of the Cold
War
The
balance of power theory suggests that the other states would balance against
the strongest state, because relative material power poses a threat against
them. After the Cold War the United States remained as the only super power in
the globe. The United States has more economic and military power, and the sum
of the rest of the world is not close enough to the power of the United States.
The balance of power theory suggests that the other states would balance
against the strongest state, because relative material power poses a threat
against them. But the world did not balanced against the United States.
The
balance of threat theory suggests an answer for the question, why the world did
not balanced against the United States since the end of the Cold War. According
to balance of threat theory, the balancing behavior (balancing or bandwagoning)
of weak states is determined by the perception of threat.[7] If
the weaker states perceive the superior as a threat they balance or bandwagon.
The United States was not perceived as a threat by the world. There has not
been any balancing action against it.
The
economic and military capabilities of the United States are far ahead of the
all the other states’ capabilities. The United States’ aggregate power and
offensive capabilities could have led the perception of threat as two of the
four factors that affect the level of threat. However the positive effect of
the other two factors (proximity and aggressive intention) outweighs the effect
of these two factors. For the proximate power, the unique geography of the
United States, being away of the contentious old world hinders the perception
of threat. The best explanation within the balance of threat theory is the
offensive intention factor. United States did not show any sign of aggressive
intention towards the rest of the world despite its preponderance.
United
States conducted many military operations after the cold war era. For each operation
the United States sought for
alliance and legitimacy. The military operations were held against terrorist
threats to the United States or for the basic values of liberalism. The
Afghanistan and Iraq wars conducted against terrorists and supporter of
terrorists. No state thought that the United States one day will invade it
during the wars and military operations of the post-Cold War era; it was clear
that the United States has no aggressive intentions to other states in the
world. So they did not balance against the United States.
The
alliances for the military operations may be considered as bandwagoning, but
the opposition sides in the military operations were terrorist organization,
states that support terrorist organization, or rouge states that endanger all
the states. The members of the alliances were on the side of the super power
for the shared values of the free world, and for the benefit of gaining
military expertise in those operations.
Liberal Institutionalism Theory and
Balancing the United States
Liberal
institutionalists view international institutions as the core element of the
international relations. According to intuitionalism states are not unitary and
rational actors, and over the time they became more focused on their economic
development and less concerned about their security and power. States are more
prone to cooperate. In an interlinked world the essential role of institutions
is important.[8]
Institutions can create cooperative efforts between states. [9] Institutions
can play an effective role in establishing coordination among states by
creating a credible venue for sharing information. Institutions can play a
controlling role on power and interest.[10]
Why
the World did not Balanced Against the United States Since the End of the Cold
War
The
institutions that were established after the World War II prevent the other states
balancing against the United States. The UN, NATO, IMF, and World Bank was
created by United States, and they are still strong institutions. They play a
crucial role in international politics. The institutions are core in today’s
world order. The United States support these institutions and bind itself with
the regulative decisions of these institutions.[11]
Ikenberry
uses the word “the western order” for the institutions that were established
after the World War II and explains the evolution of the western order in four
phases. First, the institutions established against spread of communism and to
prevent rivalries within central Europe. Second, United States limited itself and
sacrificed more than the others to assure weaker states about its benevolence
intentions. Third, the western order was acceptable because of liberal
characteristics of the institutions. Four, the institutions infused widely in
the political and economic world order.[12]
The
institutions and world order, in which the super power limits itself, assure
the weaker states that there will be no threat from the superior power. One of
the great successful institutions of the western order is NATO. In NATO all members
has the right to vote for any issue and has the right to veto any issue. Since
all the decision made with unanimity, the weaker states are strong at the
table. The weaker and smaller members sit on the same table with the super
power and decide together. The United Nations Security Council members can veto
any decision and pull the string of the super power. The super power’s self-limitation
in the world order prevents other states balancing against super power.
There
have been some military operations that may have been considered as aggressive
intention, but in all cases the United States conducted all military operations
under the umbrella of an alliance, and most of the time the United States sought
for a UN Security Council resolution. The United States military power is by
itself greater than the rest of the world, but it limits itself for the sake of
the world order. These kinds of limitations on the super power underpin the
credibility of the institutions.
Moreover
the institutions have created opportunity for weaker states to relatively gain
more power than balancing or bandwagoning. The interlinked economic system enforced
and regulated by institutions enables weaker states economically gain more. China
as an emerging power benefits from the current economic and political order. The
International Monetary Fund and World Bank loan credits to states to subsidize
their economic system.
Current
institutions created a system that enables the states to have a voice against
the super power. The institutions enable to solve the problems among the states
peacefully. The super power binds itself in this institutional system. The
world did not balanced against United States because in this system of
institutions there is no reason to do so.
Conclusion
There
are two explanations for the reasons that the world did not balanced against
the United States. First, according to balance of threat theory the United
States was not perceived as a threat by the world. Although the resources and
the offensive capability of the United States may be tempting for the balancing
action, the proximity and the non-aggressiveness factors that affect the threat
level prevent the perception of threat and so the world did not balanced
against the United States. Second, according to liberal institutionalism theory
the institutions created a venue for the weaker states to voice their
intentions towards the super power, and the institutions are limiting the super
power’s actions. The institutions have created an environment for the other
states to gain relatively more than balancing or bandwagoning.
The
institutions have a crucial role for not balancing against the United States,
however, the main factor for not balancing against the super power is the level
of aggressive intention of the United States. If the United States would be
more aggressive after the Cold War era there could have been some balancing
actions. Non aggressiveness prevented the other states balancing against the
United States, the institutions fostered the situation.
Bibliography
Ikenberry, G. John.
“Democracy, Institutions, and American Restraint.” in America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Pow, edited by G.
John Ikenberry, 213-38. Cornell University Press, 2002.
Waltz, Kenneth M.. Theory
of International Politics. New York: McGraw Hill, 1979.
Walt, Stephen.
“Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power.” International Security (Spring 1985): 3-43.
Grieco, Joseph
M.. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest
Liberal Institutionalism.” International
Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988):485-507.
Walt, Stephen
M.. “International Relations: One World, Many Theories.” Foreign Policy No. 110 (Spring 1998):29-46.
Keohane,
Robert O. and Lisa L. Martin. “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory.” International
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[1]
G. John Ikenberry, “Democracy, Institutions,
and American Restraint,” in America
Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, G. John Ikenberry, ed., (Cornell
University Press, 2002), 213.
[4] Stephen Walt, “Alliance
Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International
Security (Spring 1985), 9.
[5] Walt, “Alliance Formation,” 9.
[6] Walt, “Alliance Formation,” 9-12
[8] Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist
Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), 488-90.
[9] Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many
Theories,” Foreign Policy, No. 110
(Spring 1998), 39.
[10] Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of
Institutionalist Theory,” International Security, Vol. 20,
No. 1 (Summer, 1995), pp. 42.
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